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JURISDICTION IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS: FOREIGN
PLAINTIFFS AND THE RECIPROCITY STATUTE
IN Nippon Hodo Co. v. United States' the Court of Claims adopted
a solicitous attitude toward the claims of foreign plaintiffs against the
United States where jurisdiction depends on the existence of reciprocity.
Two Japanese corporate plaintiffs bringing contract suits against the
Government? asserted jurisdiction under both the reciprocity provisions
of section 2502 of the Judicial Code3 and under the national treatment
provision of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation be-
tween the United States and Japan.4 The Court of Claims, relying
solely on section 2502, permitted the plaintiffs to maintain their suits.5
Section 2502 grants foreign plaintiffs the right to sue the United
States in its courts if a reciprocal right is afforded to an American citizen
in the plaintiff's country.0 The Government contended that the statute
required reciprocity in specie, i.e., that it was necessary to show that an
'Nippon Hodo Co. v. United States5 Fuiji Sangyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. United
States, 285 F.zd 766 (Ct. Cl.), rehearing denied, 285 F.zd 766 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
' The plaintiff Japanese corporations brought separate suits against the Government
to recover additional costs incurred in the construction of U.S. facilities in Japan.
In both cases the Government was granted a separate trial on the issue of whether
the court's jurisdiction extends to suits against the U.S. by citizens of Japan. Since
the identical jurisdictional issue was presented in both actions, the cases were consoli-
dated for hearing and decision on that issue.
In an earlier hearing on the plaintiff Nippon Hodo's claim, x6o F. Supp. 5oi (Ct.
Cl. 1958), the Government introduced an instrument signed by plaintiff's agents re-
leasing "all claims and demands which the contractor now has." The Court of Claims,
through Judge Madden, held that the parties did not intend to execute a release of the
claim here in question and denied the government's motion for a summary judgment.
Id. at 5oz. Jones, C.J., vigorously dissented on the contract principle that a court of
equity cannot reform an instrument to compensate for the unilateral misunderstanding
of a party. Ibid.
'z8 U.S.C. § 2502 (1958).
"April 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, art. IV, sec. i.
' Chief Judge Jones delivered the opinion, with Judges Durfee, Madden and
Whitaker concurring. Judge Laramore delivered a separate dissenting opinion stating
reasons for his feeling that the government's contention should have been approved.
285 F.2d at 770.
' "Citizens or subjects of any foreign government which accords to citizens of the
United States the right to prosecute claims against their government in its courts may
sue the United States in the Court of Claims if the subject matter of the suit is otherwise
within such court's jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 2502 (958).
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American can sue the plaintiff's government on the same type of claim.
7
The court dearly rejected the government's contention and held
that "[Section 25o2] contemplates only that Americans enjoy equal
standing with foreigners in actions against the foreign government and
does not require that the scope of actions for which the respective coun-
tries render themselves liable shall be co-extensively identical... .8 In
so holding, the majority of the court reasoned that adoption of the
government's contention would add no luster to the ccgolden rule of
conduct" that has long guided our country in its international affairs,"
and they further expressed doubt that such a position would be in keep-
ing with the attitude of the American people that our country is gen-
erous and should be willing to lead and act first.1"
The court apparently believes that reciprocity is not a theory to be
strictly construed in considering the jurisdictional question where
foreign plaintiffs have claims against the United States. This becomes
apparent when considered in light of the court's lengthy discussion of
plaintiff's evidence."' The plaintiffs contended that if Section 25o2
required proof of reciprocity in specie, they had made an adequate
showing.' 2 The court, having decided that an American need only be
able to sue on some type of claim, said, in effect, that even had the
government's narrow construction been approved, plaintiffs still would
have prevailed.
This dictum strongly suggests that the court is willing to accept
rather meagre evidence of the existence of reciprocity. This analysis of
the court's atttiude is strengthened by the fact that here the problem
'Brief for Defendant, p. 8. Another statutory provision, not available to the
Government here, specifically requires reciprocity in specie. Public Vessels Act § 5,
43 Stat. 113 (1zs), 46 U.S.C. § 785 (1958). For interpretation of this statute see
Maiorino v. United States, xxi F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1952 ) ; Lopez v. United States,
io2 F. Supp. 870 (E.D.N.Y. r952).
285 F.2d at 767, 768.
2±85 F.zd at 767.
10 Ibid.
"" The opinion of the Commissioner in this case said only that section zso, did not
contemplate reciprocity in specie and did not discuss the findings of fact regarding
plaintiff's evidence. "It is not necessary to determine whether the Japanese Government
permits itself to be sued in contract actions." Opinion and Findings of Fact of Com-
missioner Bernhardt, p. 2.
Actions brought in the Court of Claims are first tried before a Commissioner, who
submits findings of fact, opinion and conclusions of law to the court under orders
of the court promulgated pursuant to Rule 45. CT. CLAaImS R. 45.
"Brief for Plaintiff, p. 9.
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of proving foreign law13 was particularly difficult since there were no
decided cases in which Japanese courts had entertained a contract suit
by an American against the Japanese government.
14
Absent judicial precedent, it has generally been held necessary to
produce statutory evidence of foreign law as well as expert testimony
regarding the proper interpretation of the foreign law in question.1
5
Plaintiffs produced constitutional' and statutory 7 excerpts from which
"3 The problem of proving foreign law was difficult historically. The common
law of England and the United States viewed foreign law as a fact to be pleaded and
proved as part of plaintiff's cause of action. The origin of this principle was a
feeling that it was unrealistic and impractical to presume the court's knowledge of
the law of other jurisdictions. A rigid corollary to this rule was that the court could
not judicially notice the laws of a foreign country.
Owing in part to the time, expense and difficulty of introducing into evidence the'
proof of foreign law and in part to the injustices resulting from technical objections
to presentation of otherwise competent evidence, a need for reform appeared. Pursuant
to the urging of European and American legal philosophers, legislatures began adopting
measures which specifically provided for judicial notice of the law of foreign juris-
dictions. The purpose of the statutes thus enacted was to put resolution of the ques-
tion in the hands of the court rather than the jury and to reduce what were deemed
the unnecessary evidentiary formalities of introducing foreign law into the case without
abolishing the need for its proof. The trend to legislation of this type has been aided
by the adoption in z6 states of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act. This
act allows courts of the enacting state to notice judicially the law of sister states but
not that of foreign countries. SOMMERICH & BUSCH, FOREIGN LAW: A GUIDE TO
PLEADING AND PROOF, 11-20 (1959).
Under Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if the instant claim
had been brought in a federal district court in a state which statutorily provides for
judicial notice of the law of foreign countries, e.g. MASS. GEN. LAws, c. 233, § 70
(1956), plaintiff would have had to produce only the Constitutional and statutory ex-
cerpts. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 43.09 at 1342-5 (2d ed. 1951). Rule
43(a) was not available in this case, however, since the Court of Claims operates under
its own rules rather than under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See SCHLESINGER,
COMPARATIVE LAW 50 (2d ed. 1959).
"* Plaintiffs failed to submit translations of any such cases. Further the opinion
of the court also seems to indicate that there were no such cases. 285 F.zd at 768.
" The case in which English courts first adopted this technique is The Sussex
Peerage Case, ii Cl. & Fin. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. s844). See cases cited in
7 WIGMORE, EVIDEN E § 2ogo-a(c) (3 rd ed. 594o).
English courts have required an expert witness regardless of the clarity of the
foreign statute involved. The Sussex Peerage Case, supra. Some American courts
have been less rigid where the interpretation of the foreign statute is clear. See, e.g.,
Molson's Bank v. Boardman, 47 Hun. 135, 142 (N.Y. 1888). Accord, Max v. Max,
123 N.J.L, 58o, io A.2d 163 (1940); Fithian v. Pennsylvania R.R., 91 N.J.L. 275,
103 Ad. 193 (1918) Lorch v. Eglin, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.zd 841 (1952). See Som-
merich & Busch, The Expert Witness & the Proof of Foreign Law, 38 CORNELL L.Q.
125, 148-9 (1953). See also SOMmERICH & BUSCH, supra note 13, at 43.
1 "Every person may sue for redress as provided by law from the State or a public
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it was only inferable that American citizens had such a right in Jap-
anese courts.
Plaintiffs also offered the deposition of a Japanese attorney in sup-
port of their contentions.1 8 The deposition, however, addressed itself
to the problem of whether a Japanese citizen could bring a contract
suit against his government,19 rather than the effect of the constitutional
provisions on the rights of American plaintiffs.20 The majority had felt
that it was only necessary to show that Americans had the same rights
in Japanese courts as Japanese citizens.21 The dissent pointed out that
even assuming this, there was little evidence from which to find that
entity, in case he has suffered damage through illegal act of any public official."
JAPANESE CONST. art. XVII. (Emphasis added.)
"No person shall be denied the right of access to the courts [of Japan]." JAP-
ANESE CONsr. art. XXXII.
" "If a public official entrusted with the exercise of the public power of the State or
of a public entity, has, in the conduct of this official duties, inflicted intentionally or
through negligence any damages on another person through an illegal act, the State or
the public entity concerned shall be under obligation to make compensation therefor."
State Redress Law of Japan art. I (Law No. 125 of x947).
"In cases where a foreigner is the injured party, this statute shall apply only if
the compensation is reciprocally guaranteed." State Redress Law of Japan art. 6 (Law
No. 125 of 1947).
Compare III Civil Code of Japan c. I, II, relating to contracts. The chapters con-
tain no specific provision according or denying a right to sue the state or its agents
and officials for damage resulting from breach of contract with the state. (Finding
of Fact No. 14) Nippon Hodo Co. v. United States, Opinion of the Court, p. I.
See also, Japanese Court Organization Law (Law No. 59 of 1947), as atnenden
(Law No. 287 of 195o). This statute, which describes the jurisdiction of Japanese
courts, contains no specific provision according or denying a right to sue the state or its
agents and officials for damage resulting from breach of contract with the state.
(Finding of Fact No. Is) Nippon Hodo Co. v. United States, Opinion of the Court,
p. 1o, 11.
" The deposition of Mr. Baba Tosaku, a citizen of Japan and an active member
of the Japanese and Tokyo Bar Associations.
19 "A Japanese citizen has the right to sue the Japanese State for breach of con-
tract. . . . In the numerous suits which are continually brought against the State,
I have never known of any question being raised whether the citizen can sue the State
and I have never heard of such a question. Since it is the general opinion of the
Japanese Bar that a citizen may bring an action against the State, equally for breach
of contract, for payment of salary or damages of other kinds, ..." (Finding of Fact
17). Nippon Hodo Co. v. United States, Opinion of the Court, p. 12.
Compare 285 F.zd at 768, where the court says: 'Plaintiffs produced a deposition
from a Japanese attorney, an experienced member of the Tokyo Bar Association, stating
in unequivocal language that an American shared equally with a Japanese citizen
[the right to sue the government in contract]." (Emphasis added.)
" Compare text at note 16, supra.
2285 F.2d at 767, 768.
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plaintiffs could sue their own government on a contract claim and that,
absent convincing proof in this regard, accepting jurisdiction might give
them more rights here than they have in their own country.22
As further proof plaintiffs offered the reply of the Japanese Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs to inquiries from our State Department con-
cerning the availability of Japanese courts to American citizens.23 Al-
though the statement was to the effect that American citizens share
equally with citizens of Japan the right of access to Japanese courts, 4
the questionable legal authority of these recitals25 renders them little
more than conjecture. Thus it appears that the court, while bound to
give effect to the reciprocity requirement of the statute, will view evi-
dence of existing reciprocity in a manner that will open the Court of
Claims to as many foreign plaintiffs as possible."
The court, by adopting Section 25o2 as its ground for decision, chose
the broader and more troublesome of two available bases. The same
result could have been reached more easily by applying the provisions
of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States and Japan,"1 and, indeed, plaintiffs had principally relied
on it to invoke the court's jurisdiction.2 8  The treaty provides that
Japanese nationals shall have the same access to the courts of the
United States as do American citizens. 29  Thus, plaintiffs needed only
2 z8s F.zd at 770.
23 See text at 285 F.zd at 768, nn.3&5.
" " Citizens of the United States are given the right equally with the Japanese
subjects to institute actions in Japanese courts against the Japanese government in
regard to claims arising from such legal relations betiween citizens of the United States
and the Japanese government as belong to the domains of private law." Dep't
of State File, 811.0433/51 (925).
"Contractual actions against the Japanese government may be brought by both
aliens and Japanese nationals pursuant to general provisions of the Japanese civil and
commercial codes." Dep't of State File, 194.332z/7-31 (1959).
See also text at 285 F.2d at 768, n.4.
" Although the foreign law must be proved "to the court's satisfaction," it has
been held that no particular type of proof is required. See Nicolas Eustathiou & Co.
v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Va. 1957).
"' This is not to suggest that the court will so view the reciprocity requirement of
section 25o when there is convincing proof that an American has no right of suit in
the foreign country. See 285 F.2d at 768.
"'April 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
" Brief for Plaintiff, p. 3.
" "Nationals and companies of either party shall be accorded national treatment
and most-favored nation treatment with respect to access to the courts of justice and
to administrative tribunals and agencies within the territories of the other Party, in all
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to show the applicable treaty sections and that they were covered by it.
Resolution of the jurisdictional question under the treaty would then
involve the following simple steps: An American citizen may sue the
United States on a contract claim; 30 the treaty grants a Japanese citizen
the same rights in our courts;31 therefore, a Japanese company may sue
the United States on a contract claim.3 2
The Court of Claims apparently refused to adopt the simpler treaty
approach in order to reject finally any narrow construction of Section
2502. Moreover, the discussion of plaintiffs' evidence indicates that the
court will be open to foreign claimants on the basis of reciprocity given
only the slightest evidence upon which such a finding can be sustained.
The adoption of such an attitude seems especially proper, as it displays
the willingness of the United States to assume leadership in resolving
international claims through the judicial process.
degrees of jurisdiction, both in pursuit and in defense of their rights." Art. IV, sec. i.
"The term 'national treatment' means treatment accorded within the territories of a
party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in like situa-
tions, to nationals, companies, products, vessels or other objects, as the case may be, of
such Party." Art. XXII, sec. i.
so 8 U.S.C. § 1491(4) (5958).
"See note 30, supra.
' This reasoning may be invoked in the Court of Claims by plaintiffs in seven
countries whose governments have treaties identical to the one in this case. Treaty with
China, Nov. 4, 1946 [1948], 63 Stat. 1299; Treaty with Ethiopia, Sept. 7, 195
[19531, 4 U.S.T. 2134; Treaty with Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954.
[1956], T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty with Greece, Aug. 3, 1951 [1954], 5 U.S.T.
1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Treaty with Ireland, Jan. 21, 195o, i U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S.
No. 2155; Treaty with Israel, Aug. 23, 1951 [1954], 5 U.S.T. 0so, T.I.A.S. No.
2948; Treaty with Italy, Feb. 2, 1948 [1949], 63 Stat. 2255. See z8 U.S.C.A. 2502
(Cum. Supp. 196o).
For a list of United States commercial treaties since 2778 see WILsON, UNITED STATED
CoMMERcIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW App. I, 331-4 (196o). See WIL-
SON, supra, at 333-4, for treaties with Columbia, Denmark & Haiti, not yet in force,
providing similar judicial remedies.
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